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This thesis investigates the link between ESG ratings and stock performance of European large 
capitalization firms. Using ESG ratings from three independent providers – Thomson Reuters, 
Bloomberg and Sustainalytics – we examine differences in returns of zero-investment portfolios 
with a long position in the quartile consisting of top ESG-rated firms and a short position the 
quartile consisting of low ESG-rated firms. We find differences in return based on the choice 
of rating provider. Only Thomson Reuters portfolios earn negative annual abnormal returns of 
6.0%-8.4%, suggesting that investors pay a premium for better ESG-rated firms. Given the 
observed differences in return and composition of the constructed providers’ portfolios, our 
findings suggest ESG ratings are subjective and may cause confusion when implementing ESG 
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Sustainable investing has seen a remarkable rise over the past years and has become one of the 
mainstays of investing. It involves incorporating environmental, social, and governance (ESG) 
measures into investment decisions (“MSCI”, 2020).  The Global Sustainable Investment 
Alliance has estimated that more than $30 trillion are invested applying ESG criteria (“GSI”, 
2018). Still, for investors, key questions remain: How do you incorporate ESG into investment 
decisions, and what is the risk-return trade-off of such an investment? As ESG investing is a 
relatively new trend, investors might be concerned about how incorporating ESG into a 
portfolio will affect its performance. The increased focus on sustainable investing has led to an 
emergence of ESG rating providers. These providers analyze firms and assess their corporate 
sustainability performance by applying their individual methodologies. Consequently, ratings 
are shown to be subjective (Gibson et al., 2020), which may lead to further confusion for 
investors that want to incorporate ESG features into their portfolio.  
Empirical studies have investigated the effect of corporate sustainability performance on 
different asset classes, including funds, stocks, and indices (Lima, 2017). On stock level, most 
research finds a positive relationship between corporate sustainability performance and stock 
performance (Lima, 2017). This implies that "good" ESG performers are expected to yield 
higher stock returns than "bad" ESG performers. However, more recent research suggests 
otherwise, and concludes that the expected return of a company with good ESG practices may 
be lower than of a company with bad ESG practices (Peng and Yang, 2014; Wang and Sargins, 
2020). Firms that are “bad” ESG performers may be considered as riskier. If this is the case, 
recent findings would be consistent with the risk-return trade-off which states that potential 
return rises with increased risk. Hence, we should expect to observe a negative relationship 
between ESG performance and stock performance.  
Against this background, we use ESG ratings as a measure of corporate sustainability 
performance and study its impact on stock performance. Existing literature has mainly used 
ESG ratings from one provider to assess corporate sustainability performance (Kempf and 
Osthoff, 2007). We complement existing literature by analyzing ratings from three independent 
providers in our research to examine differences in portfolio return based on the choice of 
provider. Additionally, we seek to explain the potential differences in return by investigating 
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the portfolio variances through breaking down the different portfolios and rating 
methodologies. 
To capture differences in ratings, we include the following rating providers in our analysis: 
Thomson Reuters1, Bloomberg, and Sustainalytics. These are leading rating providers 
thoroughly covering the multidimensional field of corporate sustainability. Selecting these 
providers, also ensures available ratings for the firms of interest, namely those included on the 
STOXX Europe 600 Index, as we narrow our analysis to the European market. The index 
consists of 600 large capitalization firms and provides us with a consistent data sample with 
ESG ratings available across firms and sectors.  
We sort the firms into quartiles and deciles based on ESG ratings from the specific rating 
providers. The top and bottom quartiles and deciles are of interest, as they include top-rated and 
low-rated firms in terms of ESG. This allows us to isolate the top and bottom groups containing 
the best and worst firms in corporate sustainability performance. We create a zero-investment 
portfolio with a long position in the top group and a short position bottom group. This strategy 
aims to capture differences in abnormal return between good and bad ESG performers and 
capture a possible ESG premium or discount. We do this separately for each rating provider 
and use both equal- and value-weighted portfolio returns in our analysis. Since ESG ratings are 
updated annually, we rebalance the portfolios at the beginning of each year, as we track monthly 
stock returns for six years from 2014 to 2019. This approach enables us to examine which 
portfolios that yield significant abnormal returns using this investment strategy. We aim to point 
out which providers that treat ESG as a risk factor. Specifically, we examine alphas of the ESG 
factor portfolios by applying the Fama French framework to account for possible differences in 
portfolio risk exposures.  
Our analysis’ descriptive results show that bad ESG performers tend to outperform top ESG 
performers. All portfolios have a downward trend in terms of cumulative return over the sample 
period. The most considerable outperformance of bad ESG performers is observed for Thomson 
Reuters portfolios, followed by Bloomberg. Sustainalytics' portfolios yield a smaller negative 
outperformance than the portfolio strategy constructed from the other two rating providers. The 
 
1 Thomson Reuters Financial and Risk unit was renamed Refinitiv at the end of 2018 (Reuters, 2018). As our data 
sample mainly consists of years prior to the name change, we use the name Thomson Reuters in this thesis.  
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outperformance is greater for the decile portfolios than for the quartile portfolios. These results 
are the first sign of an inverse relationship between ESG ratings and stock return.  
The Fama French regressions show a negative alpha of the ESG factor, confirming the results 
of our descriptive analysis. Only the constructed Thomson Reuters portfolios are consistently 
statistically significant for decile and quartile portfolios with a negative average monthly 
abnormal return ranging from 0.5% to 0.6%. Bloomberg’s decile portfolio shows similar 
evidence. Lastly, the regression results demonstrate that good ESG performers are larger firms 
in terms of market capitalization than the firms with low ESG rating.  
Our findings are interesting given the observed variation in performance of the different 
portfolios, suggesting ESG ratings are subjective. Only Thomson Reuters consistently picks up 
the negative abnormal return of the long-short portfolio which may imply that it is the only 
rating provider that treat ESG as a risk factor. Based on this, we examine the impact of variance 
of the Thomson Reuters portfolios in relation to the STOXX Europe 600 index as a benchmark. 
Our findings show significantly less variance in the Thomson Reuters portfolios, which implies 
that investors pay a premium for better rated ESG firms. 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. The second section reviews existing literature on 
corporate sustainability, ESG rating disagreement, and the link between corporate sustainability 
and stock performance. Section 3 covers our hypothesis. Section 4 describes our data sample 
and adjustments made. Section 5 describes empirical methodology for the analysis, and section 







2. Literature Review 
The second section aims to provide an overview on the field of study and existing literature on 
the topic. The section is divided into three subsections: a brief introduction to corporate 
sustainability and investing, ESG rating disagreement, and previous research on the link 
between corporate sustainability and stock performance.  
2.1. A Brief Introduction to Corporate Sustainability  
Governments worldwide have enacted more than 500 regulations that attempt to incentivize the 
implementation of ESG features into investment decisions (KPMG, 2020). This has resulted in 
a positive shift where investors, shareholders, and governments now require more accurate 
information on environmental, social, and governance aspects. The Global Sustainable 
Investment Alliance (GSIA) estimated that more than $30 trillion are invested applying ESG 
criteria to analyze and select investments (GSIA, 2020). Socially responsible investing (“SRI”) 
and corporate sustainability have thus received increasing attention in financial research over 
the last two decades (Lima, 2017).  
Academic studies have examined the association between ESG ratings with different variables 
of interest, such as stock market performance, accounting performance, financial constraints, 
and governance characteristics (Gibson et al., 2020). Lima (2017) covers a thorough analysis 
of more than 80 empirical papers from the SRI field and further divides previous research into 
empirical analysis on three different asset classes: funds, stocks, and indices. Funds have 
received the most attention by comparing SRI funds to conventional benchmarks. The second 
category, stocks, mainly focuses on constructing different portfolios of individual stocks based 
on their ESG ratings and comparing them. The third category, indices, has received the least 
amount of attention in the research. Typically, indices’ research is based on comparing the 
performance of different ESG indices with their respective benchmark. Overall, most previous 
research choses one specific rating provider and measure the effect of corporate sustainability 
on the different asset classes (Lima, 2017). We add to this literature by including ratings from 
three independent providers. 
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2.2. ESG Rating Disagreement – Empirical Evidence 
ESG rating providers have the objective of measuring firms’ corporate sustainability 
performance. Although providers base their ESG ratings on the same pillars (environmental, 
social, and governance), there is often substantial disagreement as they use different rating 
methodologies (Christensen et al., 2020). In recent years, financial journalists (Mackintosh, 
2018) and academics (Chatterji et al., 2016; Gibson et al., 2020) have drawn attention to this 
topic. Further, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) commissioner, Hester M. 
Pierce, has expressed apprehensions regarding the considerable dispersions in ESG ratings. In 
2019 she said, "the different ratings available can vary so widely, and provide such bizarre 
results that it is difficult to see how they can effectively guide investment decisions". (Pierce 
2019).  Hence, investors seeking to implement ESG investment strategies could be deceived by 
ESG ratings. This issue is further discussed in an article published by the Financial Times, 
highlighting the importance of ESG providers' methodology. The journalist discusses that in 
the absence of agreements among providers, investors do not necessarily comprehend how the 
rating is calculated (Allen, 2018).  
Moreover, a working paper published by Harvard Business School argues that, for instance, a 
greater disclosure score results in a higher disagreement among providers (Christensen et al., 
2020). They find a greater disagreement in the case of firms with high- or low ESG ratings, 
than firms with a medium rating. Other researchers study the impact of ESG rating 
disagreement on stock returns. Gibson et al. (2020) document a wide dispersion of six 
prominent rating providers with an average correlation 0.46. Disagreement regarding the firm's 
financials can result in prices primarily reflecting optimistic investors as pessimistic investors 
usually are not involved in the market due to high short-sales constraints (Miller 1977). Based 
on this premise, Gibson et al. (2020) found that ESG rating disagreement results in 
overvaluation and hence lower financial returns.  
Berg et al. (2019) outline three sources of disagreement among rating providers; the use of 
different categories (scope divergence), the measurement of identical categories in different 
ways (measurement divergence) and using different weights of the various categories (weight 
divergence). They argue that the different ratings mainly derive from scope and measurement 
divergence. To improve ESG data, Douglas et al. (2017) suggests the following improvements: 
First, they argue that there is a need for consistency in the material data tracked and published 
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by companies. Secondly, the corporate world needs a widely adopted and verified data provider 
standard that sets guidelines for a credible approach and reduces discrepancies across the same 
firm's ratings. They argue that investors should choose different approaches to suit their 
objectives, but the lack of transparency and basic guidelines create industry-wide credibility 
challenges. 
2.3. Corporate Sustainability and Stock Performance – Empirical 
Evidence 
Empirical studies have investigated the link between corporate sustainability and stock 
performance with inconclusive results. While several studies find this link to be positive 
(Kempf and Osthoff, 2007), others find it to be negative (Vance, 1975; Griffin and Mahon, 
1997). To investigate the relationship, ESG screening process are implemented to construct 
portfolios that meet certain sustainability requirements. Positive and negative sustainability 
screens have allowed researchers to investigate the difference in return (Amel-Zadeh and 
Serafeim, 2018). Previous research has shown to be limited to investigating certain aspects of 
the multi-dimensional corporate sustainability field, e.g., only applying an environmental 
screen. This may lead to wrong inferences being drawn from the papers. More recent studies 
address this issue by investigating the link by using ESG ratings to capture the overall corporate 
sustainability performance (Lima, 2017).  
Kempf and Osthoff (2007) were among the first researchers to apply the Fama French 
framework to examine the relationship between corporate sustainability and portfolio 
performance. They find that the performance of the socially responsible portfolios is never 
significantly negative, implying that socially responsible investors do not suffer a performance 
loss by reaching their sustainability goals. Eccles et al. (2014) made similar findings that 
socially responsible investing does not harm portfolio performance. The approach of this thesis 





3. Hypothesis  
This section presents the main hypothesis for our thesis and a supplementary research question.  
3.1. Main Hypothesis  
Investors pay a premium for holding top ESG rated firms – and therefore the return of a firm 
with good ESG practices is expected to be lower than that of a firm with bad ESG practices. 
We expect firms with a low ESG rating to be considered riskier and therefore compensate this 
risk through higher potential returns. The hypothesis aims to answer if ESG can be considered 
a risk factor in the financial markets by explaining systematic risk and returns patterns. 
3.2. Supplementary research questions 
How does the return of the long-short ESG portfolios depend on the choice of rating provider 
– does it matter which provider an investor decides to use, and what are the drivers of 
potential differences between ratings? 
This thesis aims to explicitly address the first part of the supplementary research question to 
cover potential differences in return based on the choice of rating providers. Corporate 
sustainable investors may use ratings as criteria to be included in a portfolio. If there exist large 
rating differences of the same firms, investors might use these differences to their advantage. 
This may give misleading information about the corporate sustainability level of their 
investments.  
Specific drivers of potential differences between ratings of the same firm are a more complex 
matter, which we do not aim to answer in this thesis. Instead, this will be the basis for our 






This section covers the data used in our analysis. This includes data sources and descriptive 
statistics of the final sample used in our analysis. 
4.1. Data Sources  
We obtain monthly adjusted stock prices, financial fundamentals, and Thomson Reuters ESG 
ratings from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Further, we obtain Bloomberg ESG ratings and 
Sustainalytics ESG ratings from Bloomberg Professional Services. We retrieve the Fama 
French three factors (Fama & French, 1993), the momentum factor (Carhart, 1997), and the 
Fama French five factors (Fama & French, 2015) from Kenneth R. French's data library (2020).  
Furthermore, we obtain the one-month European Central Bank government rate (ECB, 2020) 
and historical data on the STOXX Europe 600 index (Yahoo, 2020). 
4.2. ESG Data and ESG Rating Providers 
ESG ratings are obtained from three independent providers, presented in Table 1. Description 
of each rating provider is included in the following subsections.  
 
Table 1: ESG Ratings – Data Providers 
This table outlines the ESG rating providers used in this analysis. We list the providers (Data Provider), the origin of each 
provider (Origin), the rating scale (Rating Scale), the number of firms in our sample that are rated by the provider (Number 
of Stocks), and the individual rating pillars, e.g., environmental, social, governance (Pillars).  




Thomson Reuters CH 0 – 100 552 E, S, G 
Bloomberg US 0 – 100 488 E, S, G 




2 The data sample includes overall ESG scores, in addition to individual pillar scores: Environmental (E), Social 
(S) and Governance (G).  
14 
 
4.2.1.  Thomson Reuters 
Thomson Reuters provides ESG data on more than 6,000 firms dating back to 2002. The 
provider acquired ASSET4 and is the first agency to offer raw ESG-data to investors (Polk and 
Llp, 2017). In measuring ESG-ratings, Thomson Reuters employs more than 400 metrics and 
rate companies on a scale from 0-100. These are sorted into ten groups: resource use, emissions, 
innovation, management, shareholders, CSR strategy, workforce, human rights, community, 
and product responsibility – that is then accounting towards a pillar score (Reuters, 2018). 
4.2.2.  Bloomberg 
Bloomberg currently offers ESG data on more than 11,000 firms (Bloomberg, 2020). The firms 
are assessed on annual basis, on which data is gathered through CSR reports and annual reports. 
The data covers approximately 120 indicators but differs from other providers with a focus on 
penalizing companies that are missing ESG data. The ESG rating scale is from 0 to 100.  
(Bloomberg, 2019) 
4.2.3. Sustainalytics 
Sustainalytics covers more than 6,500 firms spanning over 42 sectors (Sustainalytics, 2020). It 
originates from the consolidation of DSR (Netherlands), Scoris (Germany), and AIS (Spain) in 
2008. Their methodology is based on dividing issues into three pillars: environmental, social, 
and governance and rates on a scale 0 to 100. Companies' ratings are based on an analysis of 
70 indicators for the respective sectors.  
4.3. Sample Selection 
To test our hypothesis, we construct a representative and homogenous sample. ESG ratings are 
often restricted to cross-section and time-series, as it is less available for smaller firms and 
normally only for recent years (Gibson et al., 2020). We account for this issue by restricting our 
data sample to firms included on the STOXX Europe 600 index. The index includes 600 firms 
categorized into large, middle and small capitalization firms across 17 European countries3 
(STOXX, 2020). Overall, this increases the ESG rating availability for the firms of interest.  
 
3 The index covers approximately 90% of the market capitalization of the European stock market (STOXX, 2020), 
implying the index in general consists of large capitalization firms.  
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4.3.1.  Screening 
ESG ratings from Sustainalytics are only available from 2013. We, therefore, restrict our sample 
from 2014 to 20194. Moreover, we require each firm-observation to have an ESG rating from 
minimum two of the three providers. By not requiring ESG ratings from all three providers we 
exclude the possibility for a firm not rated by a specific rating provider to be included in the 
respective portfolio. This may potentially create differences in the composition of the portfolios. 
However, we do consider this a realistic approach from an investor’s perspective. An investor 
will likely choose one rating provider for his investment decision, thus limiting the investor to 
only consider the firms rated by that specific provider. 
In summary, we construct a representative sample suitable to our approach that is not overly 
restrictive. The final data sample includes 552 (Thomson Reuters), 488 (Bloomberg) and 432 
(Sustainalytics) firms, as illustrated in Table 1.  
4.3.2.  Portfolio Selection  
This subsection details how we construct the portfolios based on the ESG ratings from the three 
rating providers.  
Our sample is restricted to only include observations in the period from 2014 to 2019, including 
six years of monthly stock data. ESG ratings are provided annually, and we lag ESG ratings to 
the following year to make sure the information on corporate sustainability is available to the 
market when calculating portfolio return.  
At the end of year 𝑡 − 1, the individual rating providers report their ratings of the firms. Based 
on these ESG ratings, we divide the companies into quartiles. Following a long-short zero-
investment strategy, we go long in the top quartile consisting of the top-rated firms and short 
the quartile consisting of low-rated firms. This creates an ESG portfolio that examines the 
difference in abnormal return between high-rated and low-rated firms. The ESG portfolio is 
formed at the beginning of year 𝑡 and held unchanged until the end of year 𝑡, as the portfolios 
rebalance annually. To examine whether our results are sensitive to different portfolio 
weighting schemes, we construct both equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios5. 
 
4 Portfolios are constructed based on the one-year lagged ESG ratings. Described in detail under section 4.3.2.  
5 Calculation of the value-weighted portfolios is described in detail in section 4.4.1.  
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The portfolio selection process described above is performed for both quartile and decile 
portfolios and repeated for each rating provider. At the end of year 𝑡, we rank the firms based 
on the updated ratings and construct the portfolios to be held in year 𝑡 + 1. This constitutes a 
to a time series of six years of monthly returns spanning from 2014 to 2019.  
In summary, we construct a total of 72 quartile and decile portfolios6 based on the ESG ratings 
from the different providers. The top and bottom quartiles and deciles are used to construct the 
long-short zero-investment portfolio (ESG portfolio), henceforth “ESG TMB” (ESG Top 
Minus Bottom). In total, the analysis covers 36 long-short zero-investment portfolios.  
4.4. Variable Descriptions  
4.4.1.  ESG Factor  
The return of the ESG TMB factor portfolio is the dependent variable when performing 
regression analysis. This is a factor investment strategy like the Fama French factors, forming 
a hedged long-short portfolio to capture the ESG premium or discount. We use both the equal-
weighted return and the value-weighted return of the long-short portfolios to capture potential 
differences. The equal-weighted return is calculated by averaging returns from the top ESG 
firms minus the returns of the bottom ESG firms. The value-weighted return is calculated as 
follows:  
Equation 1 











Where 𝑟𝑝𝑡   Value weighted portfolio return at time t 
 𝑤𝑖𝑡  Return on stock i at time t 
 
6 We explain the total number of portfolios constructed as follows: As the firms are sorted by ESG ratings provided 
by for example Thomson Reuters, we are interested in the top and bottom quartiles and deciles – in total four 
portfolios. Annual rebalancing of the portfolios leads to six new sets of these four portfolios – in total 24 portfolios. 




If the ESG risk premium exists, we should expect the return on the ESG TMB factor to be 
negative, thus a discount in factor returns.  
4.4.2.  Fama French Factors  
We obtain the Fama French factors from the Kenneth R. French Library. More specifically, we 
obtain the Western European market's risk factors applied in the regression analysis. These 
factors are representative for our analysis as the markets used to construct the factors show great 
overlap with markets represented in our data sample. The factors will be further explained in 
section 5.1. 
4.5. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Data Sample ESG Attributes 
This table presents the ESG attributes of the firms included in the data sample. We include the total number of 
firms rated (N), mean score (Mean), median (Median) and standard deviation (StdDev) of firm’s ESG rating, 
environmental rating, social rating and governance rating, separately. Correlation of the different providers are 
also included (Pearson Correlations). 
 N Mean Median StdDev  Pearson Correlations 
      Thomson Reut. Sustainalytics 
ESG Rating        
Thomson Reut. 35,241 63.637 66.000 17.669    
Sustainalytics 25,929 75.476 82.609 22.501  0.535  
Bloomberg 31,689 60.215 62.097 14.500  0.592 0.454 
     Avg 0.527  
Environmental Rating 
Thomson Reut. 35,241 61.714 66.330 25.031    
Sustainalytics 25,929 73.043 79.464 23.207  0.496  
Bloomberg 31,689 47.414 50.000 26.693  0.529 0.409 
     Avg 0.478  
Social Rating 
Thomson Reut. 35,241 67.363 71.144 20.441    
Sustainalytics 25,929 73.571 80.000 23.440  0.475  
Bloomberg 31,689 62.520 65.427 16.152  0.514 0.352 
     Avg 0.447  
Governance Rating 
Thomson Reut. 35,241 59.150 61.901 21.659    
Sustainalytics 25,929 70.259 77.612 25.514  0.318  
Bloomberg 31,689 70.711 72.113 13.218  0.327 0.158 




In the following, we present a more detailed overview of the sample with descriptive statistics 
presented in Table 2. The table shows more observations for Thomson Reuters (35,241) than 
Bloomberg (31,689) and Sustainalytics (25,929) for the sample. Despite that our sample 
consists of 35,241 observations, Bloomberg and Sustainalytics have fewer observations, as we 
only require each firm to have a rating from a minimum of two rating providers. This method 
corresponds with previous research on ESG rating dispersion (Christensen et al., 2020) and 
analyst disagreement (Sadka and Scherbina, 2007; Barinov, 2013).  
While Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg tend to issue overall ESG ratings of around 60 points 
(63.6 and 60.2 on average, respectively), Sustainalytics tends to issue higher ratings with an 
average of 75.4. Additionally, Sustainalytics has the greatest variation among the providers 
(standard deviation of 22.5), while Bloomberg has the least variance (standard deviation of 
14.5). Regarding the three pillars, these trends seem to be resembling. The exception is the 
environmental pillar, where Bloomberg issues relatively low ratings with a median of 50.0. In 
comparison, Thomson Reuters and Sustainalytics have a median of 61.7 and 73.0, respectively.  
To provide intuition for the providers' dispersion, we include a correlation matrix. The matrix 
yields interesting results and shows that for total ESG rating the providers have an average 
correlation of 0.52. These results correspond with the findings of Berg et al. (2019). 
Furthermore, the correlation is lower among the providers for the pillars than the overall rating. 
Not surprisingly, the average correlation is highest for the environmental pillar (0.47), and 
lowest for the governance pillar (0.26). These findings are consistent with previous ESG 
research (Berg et al., 2020). In general, descriptive evidence suggests that Thomson Reuters 
and Bloomberg are more coherent than Sustainalytics. Furthermore, Sustainalytics issues 
higher individual ratings compared to Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg, as evidenced by the 
mean scores.  
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5. Methodology  
We construct portfolios following a hedged long-short investment strategy with a long position 
in top ESG performers and a short position in bottom ESG performers. This allows us to 
measure differences in performance between the top and bottom portfolios with respect to ESG 
ratings from the independent rating providers. This will in turn allow us to investigate the 
historical returns of the ESG TMB portfolio by applying the Fama French framework. More 
specifically, we use Fama French three-factor, Carhart and five-factor with- and without 
momentum models. These models are more suitable to estimate portfolio returns than the 
CAPM (Bartholdy and Pearce, 2005), which has for many applications been invalidated (Fama 
and French, 2003).  
This chapter outlines the approach for our analysis and is divided into two subsections. The first 
subsection presents the Fama French models' specifications, while the second discusses the 
assumptions to justify the interpretation of our regression results.   
5.1. Model Specification – Fama French Framework 
The Fama French models attempt to explains variation in stock returns by including different 
factors that explains excess return (Womack and Zhang, 2003). The models' goal is to capture 
all variations in stock prices through the included factors. An intercept of zero implies that the 
investment strategy does not create any abnormal return, (i.e., no alpha). If an estimate is not 
statistically significant, there is no difference in exposure to this specific risk factor between 
the top and the bottom portfolios in the long-short portfolio. For the time-series analysis, we 
use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. The following subsections will briefly explain 
the different Fama French models and factors.  
5.1.1.  Fama French Three-Factor Model 
The Fama French three-factor model extends the CAPM (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 
1966) by combining the original market factor and two company-specific risk factors: SMB 
("Small Minus Big") and HML ("High Minus Low"). SMB is designed to measure the 
additional return investors have historically received by investing in stocks of companies with 
relatively small market capitalization, often referred to as the "size premium". HML is 
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constructed to measure the "value premium" provided to investors for investing in companies 
with high book-to-market value. 
Equation 2 
𝐸𝑆𝐺 𝑇𝑀𝐵𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇 × (𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 × 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 × 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 
 
𝐸𝑆𝐺 𝑇𝑀𝐵𝑡 ESG factor: Excess return on top minus bottom portfolio at time t 
𝛼 Intercept/abnormal return/alpha 
𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇 Exposure to the market factor (market beta) 
𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 Excess return in the market at time t 
𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 Exposure to the size factor 
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 The size factor at time t 
𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 Exposure to the value factor 
𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 The value factor at time t 
𝑢𝑡 Error term at time t 
 
5.1.2.  Carhart Four-Factor Model 
The Carhart model is a refinement of the three-factor model, as it adds a factor that accounts 
for performance tendency (Carhart, 1997). The additional factor is called "momentum” and 
measures a portfolio's exposure to previous winners and losers.  
Equation 3 
𝐸𝑆𝐺 𝑇𝑀𝐵𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇 × (𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 × 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 × 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡
+ 𝛽𝑀𝑂𝑀 × 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 
 
𝛽𝑀𝑂𝑀 Exposure to the momentum factor 
𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 The momentum factor at time t 
 
5.1.3.  Fama French Five-Factor Model 
The five-factor model adds two new factors, RMW ("Robust Minus Weak") and CMA 
("Conservative Minus Aggressive"). RMW represents the difference in returns between a 
portfolio comprising of firms with robust profitability and a portfolio comprising of firms with 
weak profitability. CMA represents the investment strategy approach. The factor covers the 
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difference in returns between a portfolio of low investment stocks and a portfolio of high 
investment stocks (Fama French, 2014).   
Equation 4 
𝐸𝑆𝐺 𝑇𝑀𝐵𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇 × (𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 × 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 × 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡
+ 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊 × 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴 × 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 
 
𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊 Exposure to the profitability factor 
𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 The profitability factor at time t 
𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴 Exposure to the investment factor 
𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 The investment factor at time t 
 5.1.4.  Fama French Five-Factor Model with Momentum 
This model adds the momentum factor presented in section 5.1.2. to the five-factor model 
presented in the previous subsection. 
Equation 5 
𝐸𝑆𝐺 𝑇𝑀𝐵𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇 × (𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 × 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 × 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡
+ 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑊 × 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑀𝐴 × 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽𝑀𝑂𝑀 × 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 
 
All variables for this model are explained in the previous sub-subsections. 
5.2. Model Testing 
The data must satisfy certain assumptions to justify the results of our analysis and to be valid 
for interpretation. First, we run a Breusch-Pagan test to see if we have an issue with 
heteroscedasticity. The test outputs are presented in the Appendix A1 Model Testing and show 
that we do have a problem with heteroscedasticity. Furthermore, we run a Breusch-Godfrey test 
to check for autocorrelation. The regression outputs show that we do have an issue for the equal-
weighted Bloomberg quartile portfolio, only. To address heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
problems, we run all regressions with robust standard errors, according to Sarzosa (2012). 





6. Analysis  
In this section, we present the results of our analysis. More specifically, we test whether a zero-
investment portfolio that goes long in the top rated ESG quartiles and shorts the low rated ESG 
quartile earns significant abnormal returns. We do the same for decile portfolios.  
As described in section 4, for every year, we sort firms into quartiles and deciles based on their 
ESG rating. This is done separately for the three independent rating providers. We then 
calculate both the equal-weighted and value-weighted monthly returns of each long-short 
portfolio. Lastly, we test how these portfolios perform relative to the risk-free rate and when 
controlling for the Fama French factors described in section 5. 
6.1. Descriptive Results 
6.1.1.  Portfolios Attributes  
We start off by conducting an initial analysis where we compare the attributes of the constructed 
top and bottom portfolios. Descriptive results in Table 3 shows that the top ESG portfolios 
include firms that have higher market capitalization relative to the bottom ESG portfolios. This 
is consistent for decile and quartile portfolios, but the average market capitalization is greatest 
for the deciles. Furthermore, the low-rated ESG portfolios have higher average return than the 
top-rated ESG portfolios. The largest differences are observed for portfolios constructed from 
Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg ratings. We also observe that the differences between the top 
and bottom portfolios are larger for the deciles. In summary, the portfolios’ attributes provide 
initial evidence of an inverse relationship between ESG score and average monthly stock return. 
Thus, our findings may indicate that investors pay a premium for holding high-rated ESG firms 







Table 3: Portfolio Attributes 
This table presents the total market capitalization (Market Cap) of the firms included in the constructed portfolios as well as 
the average monthly return (Monthly Return). The table is split into quartile and decile portfolios.  
Portfolio Attributes: Quartile Portfolios 
Portfolio Market Cap (mEUR) Monthly Return 
Thomson Reuters Top Quartile 55,980 0.84% 
Bloomberg Top Quartile 42,122 0.89% 
Sustainalytics Top Quartile 28,071 0.97% 
   
Thomson Reuters Bottom Quartile 6,117 1.68% 
Bloomberg Bottom Quartile 7,166 1.75% 
Sustainalytics Bottom Quartile 12,576 1.16% 
   
Portfolio Attributes: Decile Portfolios 
Portfolio Market Cap (mEUR) Monthly Return 
Thomson Reuters Top Decile 40,772 0.80% 
Bloomberg Top Decile 34,440 0.96% 
Sustainalytics Top Decile 28,008 0.81% 
   
Thomson Reuters Bottom Decile 6,671 1.55% 
Bloomberg Bottom Decile 8,627 1.38% 
Sustainalytics Bottom Decile 15,856 1.03% 
6.1.2.  Portfolios Risk and Returns  
Next, we examine the cumulative returns of the hedged long-short portfolios by plotting the 
outcome of investing EUR 1 in the portfolios. Over the sample period, the long-short 
investments have a negative return. While Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg portfolios are 
relatively similar with a negative return of almost 50%, Sustainalytics portfolios have a flatter 
trend with a negative return of approximately 10%. The cumulative returns indicate that the bad 
ESG portfolios yield higher returns than the good ESG portfolios over the sample period, 








Figure 1: Monthly Cumulative Returns of the Decile Long-Short ESG Portfolio 
This figure presents the cumulative performance (in EUR) of a EUR 1 investment in the decile long-
short portfolios from Jan. 2014 to Dec. 2019.  
 
 
Next, we examine the cumulative returns for the quartile portfolios. The negative trends are not 
as dramatic as for the decile portfolios, but the downward trends are still evident. There are also 
larger differences between the three providers than evidenced for the decile portfolios. Once 
again, Sustainalytics performs best with a negative return of roughly 15%. Both Bloomberg and 
Thomson Reuters perform better than for the decile portfolios. Bloomberg falls around 25%, 
while Thomson Reuters clearly shows the worst performance with a negative return of more 






















Figure 2: Monthly Cumulative Returns of the Quartile Long-Short ESG Portfolio 
This figure presents the cumulative performance (in EUR) of a EUR 1 investment in the quartiles long-
short portfolios from Jan. 2014 to Dec. 2019.  
 
 
The descriptive statistics, including the cumulative returns, provides us with two key 
takeaways. First, it indicates which provider you should choose if you are an investor using 
ESG as an investment criterium. Secondly, it indicates that all portfolios seemingly pick up the 
negative relationship between ESG performance and stock performance. In the next section we 















Thomson Reuters Bloomberg Sustainalytics
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6.2. Regression Results  
This section presents the results from the regression analysis. We test how the portfolios 
perform relative to the risk-free rate when controlling for the Fama French factors described in 
section 5. 
6.2.1. Fama French Three-Factor Model 
Table 4: Fama French Three-Factor Model Regression Outputs 
This table presents the results from the Fama French Three-Factor Model. It presents the factor loadings and abnormal 
returns (in percentage) of both equal-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) zero-investment portfolios with a long 
position in good ESG performers and short position in bad ESG performers. This first section shows the quartile portfolios 
picked on top/bottom quartiles, while the second section shows the decile portfolios picked on top/bottom deciles, for each 
independent provider. MktRf is the market factor, SMB is the small-minus-big size factor, HML is the high-minus-low 
value factor. 
Fama French Three-Factor Model: Regression Output Quartile Portfolios  
 Thomson Reuters ESG  Bloomberg ESG  Sustainalytics ESG 
 EW VW  EW VW  EW VW 





 (–4.481) (–2.344) (–1.455) (–0.389) (–1.531) (–0.365) 
MktRf 0.061 –0.085 –0.050 –0.181***    0.100***    0.142*** 
 (1.558) (–1.519) (–1.327) (–3.291) (3.022) (3.196) 
SMB      –0.705***    –0.812***   –0.596***  –0.628***  –0.354***   –0.307*** 
 (–9.544) (–7.071) (–7.134) (–5.610) (–5.009) (–3.138) 
HML    0.537***     0.437***     0.476***    0.488***   0.159*** 0.102 
      (8.540) (5.199) (7.407) (4.264) (2.658) (1.307) 
       
N 72 72  72 72  72 72 
R2 0.756 0.611 0.646 0.517 0.445 0.298 
Adjusted R2 0.746 0.594 0.630 0.495 0.420 0.267 
 
 
Fama French Three-Factor Model: Regression Output Decile (Small) Portfolios  
 Thomson Reuters ESG  Bloomberg ESG  Sustainalytics ESG 
 EW VW  EW VW  EW VW 
Intercept     –0.554***  –0.147 
 
   –0.592*** –0.372 
 
–0.117 –0.058 
 (–3.322) (–0.694) (–3.177) (–1.586) (–0.584) (–0.212) 
MktRf 0.026 –0.157** –0.026 –0.138**  0.113    0.175* 
 (0.430) (–2.260) (–0.623) (–2.025) (1.514) (1.698) 
SMB     –0.811***    –1.034***   –0.644***  –0.786***  –0.333** –0.356 
 (–7.170) (–7.527) (–5.975) (–5.851) (–2.135) (–1.596) 
HML    0.586***     0.275***     0.519***    0.387***   0.195* –0.074 
      (6.931) (2.706) (5.218) (2.987) (1.810) (–0.655) 
       
N 72 72  72 72  72 72 
R2 0.670 0.470 0.496 0.386 0.230 0.185 
Adjusted R2 0.589 0.446 0.474 0.358 0.196 0.149 
 
t statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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In terms of abnormal return, only Thomson Reuters shows a significant negative relationship. 
Excess return among the bottom ESG performers is on average around 0.5% higher for both 
the equally-weighted decile and quartile portfolios. As for the value-weighted portfolios, only 
the quartile portfolios show significance at the 5% level with the bottom quartile yielding 0.38% 
higher returns than the top quartile. Bloomberg also shows significantly higher returns for the 
bottom quartile of about 0.6%. None of the intercepts are significant for the Sustainalytics 
portfolios.  
Results for the systematic risk factor differ among the independent providers' portfolios. The 
bottom ESG performers rated by Bloomberg shows higher volatility than the top performers 
when value-weighted, but no difference when equal-weighted. On the other hand, 
Sustainalytics shows the opposite effect where the top performers are associated with higher 
volatility compared to the bottom performers, both when equal- and value-weighted. The value-
weighted decile portfolios of Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg show similar results, consistent 
with the high volatility of the quartile Bloomberg portfolios.  
The SMB factor shows that all quartile portfolios consisting of bad ESG performers have higher 
exposure to smaller capitalization firms than the portfolios of top ESG performers. As for the 
decile portfolios, Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg show similar evidence, while for 
Sustainalytics only the equal-weighted portfolio yields a significant factor.   
All equal-weighted quartile portfolios show a positive exposure to the HML factor, indicating 
that the top ESG portfolios are more exposed towards high value stocks than the bottom ESG 
portfolios. The relationship is weaker for Sustainalytics than for Thomson Reuters and 
Bloomberg, and the latter two also show similar results for the value-weighted portfolios.  These 
results are also valid for the decile portfolios of Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg, both equal- 






6.2.2.  Carhart Model 
Table 5: Carhart Four-Factor Model Regression Outputs 
This table presents the results from the Carhart Four-Factor Model. It presents the factor loadings and abnormal returns (in 
percentage) of both equal-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) zero-investment portfolios with a long position in good 
ESG performers and short position in bad ESG performers. This first section shows the quartile portfolios picked on 
top/bottom quartiles, while the second section shows the decile portfolios picked on top/bottom deciles, for each independent 
provider. MktRf is the market factor, SMB is the small-minus-big size factor, HML is the high-minus-low value factor, 
UMD is the momentum factor. 
Carhart Four-Factor Model: Regression Output Quartile Portfolios  
 Thomson Reuters ESG  Bloomberg ESG  Sustainalytics ESG 
 EW VW  EW VW  EW VW 





 (–4.406) (–2.481) (–1.820) (–0.779) (–1.464) (–0.262) 
MktRf 0.065 –0.066 –0.027 –0.150**    0.101***    0.136*** 
 (1.523) (–1.146) (–0.652) (–2.596) (2.782) (2.701) 
SMB     –0.706***    –0.818***   –0.602***  –0.636***  –0.354***   –0.305*** 
 (–9.291) (–7.063) (–7.395) (–5.646) (–4.836) (–3.005) 
HML    0.545***     0.475***     0.522***    0.509***   0.162** 0.090 
      (7.624) (4.941) (7.744) (4.300) (2.597) (1.043) 
UMD 0.017 0.075 0.091 0.120 0.005 –0.023 
 (0.244) (0.846) (1.418) (1.208) (0.093) (–0.305) 
       
N 72 72  72 72  72 72 
R2 0.757 0.618 0.659 0.535 0.445 0.299 
Adjusted R2 0.742 0.595 0.639 0.507 0.411 0.257 
 
 
Carhart Four-Factor Model: Regression Output Decile Portfolios  
 Thomson Reuters ESG  Bloomberg ESG  Sustainalytics ESG 
 EW VW  EW VW  EW VW 
Intercept     –0.604***       –1.888 
 
   –0.586*** –0.385 
 
–0.069 0.002 
 (–3.144) (–0.794) (–2.867) (–1.504) (–0.361) (0.006) 
MktRf 0.047 –0.140* –0.029 –0.132  0.092 0.150 
 (0.763) (–1.906) (–0.584) (–1.709) (1.352) (1.585) 
SMB    –0.816***    –1.038***   –0.643**  –0.788***  –0.326** –0.349 
 (–7.294) (–7.524) (–5.844) (–5.678) (–2.015) (–1.498) 
HML    0.627***     0.309**     0.514***    0.398***   0.155 –0.123 
      (6.334) (2.386) (4.575) (2.735) (1.256) (–0.950) 
UMD 0.081 0.066 –0.010 0.022 –0.078 –0.096 
 (0.837) (0.513) (–0.180) (0.165) (–0.603) (–0.531) 
       
N 72 72  72 72  72 72 
R2 0.612 0.473 0.497 0.386 0.238 0.193 
Adjusted R2 0.589 0.441 0.466 0.349 0.193 0.145 
 
t statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses 





When applying the Carhart model, the excess return of the different portfolios follows similar 
patterns as for the Three-factor model. The coefficients are similar estimates. For the equal-
weighted quartile portfolios, only Thomson Reuters shows significant results below the 5% 
level. However, for the equal-weighted decile portfolios, Bloomberg also shows a significant 
negative relationship. In summary, the excess return of the bad ESG performers is about 0.5% 
and on average 0.6% for the quartile and decile portfolios, respectively.  
Considering the systematic risk of the portfolios, only Sustainalytics shows a significant 
coefficient. As for the Three-factor model the coefficient is positive, implying that the top ESG 
performers have higher volatility than the bad performers. However, this is only valid for the 
quartile portfolio, whereas none of the coefficients are significant for the decile portfolios. 
The SMB factor has the same characteristics when applying the Three-factor model with the 
bad ESG firms of the quartile portfolios being smaller in market capitalization. When sorted 
into decile portfolios, Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg show similar results, while only the 
equal-weighted portfolio is significant at the 5% level for Sustainalytics. 
Like the Three-factor model, all equal-weighted quartile portfolios show a positive exposure to 
the HML factor. Still, there is a weaker significance for Sustainalytics than the two other 
providers. Only, Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg yield significant results for the value-
weighted quartile portfolios, as well for their decile portfolios.  





6.2.3.  Fama French Five Factor Model  
Table 6: Fama French Five-Factor Model Regression Outputs 
This table presents the results from the Fama French Five Four-Factor Model. It presents the factor loadings and abnormal 
returns (in percentage) of both equal-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) zero-investment portfolios with a long 
position in good ESG performers and short position in bad ESG performers. This first section shows the quartile portfolios 
picked on top/bottom quartiles, while the second section shows the decile portfolios picked on top/bottom deciles, for each 
independent provider. MktRf is the market factor, SMB is the small-minus-big size factor, HML is the high-minus-low 
value factor, RMW is the robust-minus-weak profitability factor, CMA is the conservative-minus-aggressive investment 
factor.  
Fama French Five-Factor Model: Regression Output Quartile Portfolios  
 Thomson Reuters ESG  Bloomberg ESG  Sustainalytics ESG 
 EW VW  EW VW  EW VW 





 (–5.526) (–2.630) (–1.418) (–0.166) (–1.448) (0.171) 
MktRf    0.082** –0.059 –0.038     –0.176***    0.103***    0.128*** 
 (2.051) (–1.082) (–0.979) (–3.309) (2.968) (2.840) 
SMB    –0.619***    –0.728***   –0.561***    –0.633***  –0.342***   –0.371*** 
 (–8.797) (–6.811) (–5.979) (–5.769) (–4.771) (–3.662) 
HML    0.741***     0.537***     0.478***    0.346**  0.177* –0.047 
      (6.597) (3.870) (3.992) (2.092) (1.775) (–0.339) 
RMW      0.470***   0.349*  0.097 –0.103        0.057 –0.317* 
      (3.333) (1.915) (0.646) (–0.445) (0.432) (–1.866) 
CML       0.232*   0.327* 0.182  0.151  0.062 –0.083 
      (1.873) (1.709) (0.956) (0.554) (0.422) (–0.460) 
       
N 72 72  72 72  72 72 
R2 0.804 0.650 0.653 0.532 0.445 0.337 
Adjusted R2 0.789 0.624 0.627 0.497 0.403 0.286 
 
 
Fama French Five-Factor Model: Regression Output Decile Portfolios  
 Thomson Reuters ESG  Bloomberg ESG  Sustainalytics ESG 
 EW VW  EW VW  EW VW 
Intercept     –0.651***       –0.242 
 
    –0.601*** –0.351 
 
–0.077 0.099 
 (–3.884) (–1.070) (–2.693) (–1.323) (–0.375) (0.389) 
MktRf 0.042 –0.142* 0.001 –0.116 0.072  0.124 
 (0.677) (–1.993) (0.028) (–1.550) (1.101) (1.468) 
SMB     –0.730***    –0.961***   –0.571***  –0.743***    –0.433***   –0.523*** 
 (–6.336) (–6.752) (–3.809) (–4.791) (–3.349) (–2.961) 
HML    0.843***     0.549***    0.432**  0.249  0.355* –0.229 
      (5.782) (2.942) (2.420) (1.088) (1.836) (–1.036) 
RMW      0.519***   0.550**  0.047 –0.058 –0.045 –0.579 
      (2.822) (2.192) (0.203) (–0.188) (–0.151) (–1.479) 
CML       0.170   0.190 0.347  0.326  –0.434 –0.480 
      (0.961) (0.904) (1.526) (1.145) (–1.038) (–0.864) 
       
N 72 72  72 72  72 72 
R2 0.637 0.505 0.507 0.399 0.262 0.262 
Adjusted R2 0.609 0.468 0.469 0.353 0.206 0.206 
 
t statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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The Fama French Five-factor model provides similar evidence as the previous models on the 
excess return of our long-short zero investment strategy. Only Thomson Reuters quartile 
portfolios show a significant difference on the returns of the top and bottom ESG performers. 
This is true for both the equal- and value-weighted portfolio. Excess return among the bottom 
ESG performers is on average 0.6% and 0.45% higher than for the top ESG performers, for the 
equal- and value-weighted quartiles, respectively. Bloomberg is significant for the equal-
weighted decile portfolio, showing 0.6% higher excess return for the bottom ESG performers 
than for the top performers. This relationship is also valid for the equal-weighted Thomson 
Reuters decile portfolio with a 0.65% higher return of the bottom ESG performers compared to 
the top performers.  
Sustainalytics shows significant coefficients for systematic risk of both its quartile portfolios, 
which is in line with the Carhart model. Similar coefficients are observed for the Thomson 
Reuters equal-weighted quartile portfolio and Bloomberg’s value-weighted quartile portfolio. 
In contrast to Sustainalytics and Thomson Reuters, Bloomberg shows a negative coefficient for 
systematic risk, implying that the bottom ESG performers have higher volatility than the top 
performers.  
The SMB factor has the same characteristics as we control for the different factors. All 
portfolios show a significant negative coefficient. The HML factor show similar characteristics 
as the previous models with Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg demonstrating significant 
coefficients of their portfolios.  
The five-factor model introduces two new factors, RMW and CMA. Only the former is of 
interest, showing significant positive coefficients for the Thomson Reuters decile portfolios, as 
well as for the Thomson Reuters equal-weighted quartile portfolio. This implies that the top 
ESG performers constitute firms with more robust profitability than the bottom ESG 




6.2.4.  Fama French Five Factor with Momentum 
Table 7: Fama French Five-Factor Model with Momentum Regression Outputs 
This table presents the results from the Fama French Five-Factor Model with momentum. It presents the factor loadings and 
abnormal returns (in percentage) of both equal-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) zero-investment portfolios with a 
long position in good ESG performers and short position in bad ESG performers. This first section shows the quartile 
portfolios picked on top/bottom quartiles, while the second section shows the decile portfolios picked on top/bottom deciles, 
for each independent provider. MktRf is the market factor, SMB is the small-minus-big size factor, HML is the high-minus-
low value factor, RMW is the robust-minus-weak profitability factor, CMA is the conservative-minus-aggressive investment 
factor, UMD is the momentum factor.  
Fama French Five-Factor Model with Momentum: Regression Output Quartile Portfolios  
 Thomson Reuters ESG  Bloomberg ESG  Sustainalytics ESG 
 EW VW  EW VW  EW VW 
Intercept     –0.605***  –0.481**  –0.241 –0.099  –0.169 0.049 
 (–4.916) (–2.576) (–1.644) (–0.504) (–1.393) (0.295) 
MktRf 0.084* –0.047 –0.022 –0.155**    0.103***    0.121*** 
 (1.907) (–0.810) (–0.489) (–2.670) (2.706) (2.606) 
SMB     –0.622***    –0.741***   –0.579***  –0.656***    –0.342***   –0.363*** 
 (–8.641) (–6.700) (–6.150) (–5.654) (–4.655) (–3.485) 
HML    0.754***     0.596***     0.559***    0.451***  0.177 –0.081 
      (5.373) (4.005) (4.355) (2.776) (1.364) (-0.468) 
RMW       0.474***     0.367** 0.122 –0.071 0.057 –0.328* 
      (3.181) (2.006) (0.792) (–0.312) (0.410) (–1.906) 
CMA       0.221  0.279  0.115 0.064 0.062 –0.055 
      (1.593) (1.503) (0.697) (0.274) (0.383) (–0.274) 
UMD 0.014 0.059 0.082 0.107 –0.001 –0.035 
 (0.210) (0.673) (1.319) (1.057) (–0.007) (–0.422) 
       
N 72 72  72 72  72 72 
R2 0.804 0.654 0.663 0.545 0.445 0.339 
Adjusted R2 0.786 0.622 0.632 0.503 0.394 0.278 
 
Fama French Five-Factor Model with Momentum: Regression Output Decile Portfolios  
 Thomson Reuters ESG  Bloomberg ESG  Sustainalytics ESG 
 EW VW  EW VW  EW VW 
Intercept     –0.712*** –0.292    –0.566** –0.336  –0.054 0.152 
 (–3.487) (–1.121) (–2.270) (–1.135) (–0.251) (0.586) 
MktRf 0.060 –0.127* –0.009 –0.121 0.065  0.108 
 (0.934) (–1.682) (–0.171) (–1.498) (0.942) (1.144) 
SMB     –0.750***    –0.978***   –0.559***  –0.738***    –0.425***   –0.505*** 
 (–6.218) (–6.664) (–3.624) (–4.508) (–3.082) (–2.759) 
HML    0.938***     0.625*** 0.378  0.227  0.298 –0.311 
      (4.586) (2.724) (1.650) (0.847) (1.483) (–1.349) 
RMW      0.548***   0.574**  0.031 –0.065 –0.057 –0.604 
      (2.693) (2.188) (0.127) (–0.202) (–0.179) (–1.485) 
CML       0.092  0.127 0.392  0.344  –0.404 –0.413 
      (0.439) (0.564) (1.630) (1.114) (–1.021) (–0.806) 
UMD 0.096 0.078 –0.055 –0.023 –0.037 –0.083 
 (0.930) (0.574) (–0.495) (–0.152) (–0.301) (–0.529) 
       
N 72 72  72 72  72 72 
R2 0.644 0.509 0.509 0.399 0.264 0.267 
Adjusted R2 0.611 0.464 0.464 0.344 0.196 0.200 
t statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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The final model adds the momentum factor to the specifications of the Fama French five-factor 
model. As for excess return, we register similar results for the two models. Only Thomson 
Reuters' portfolios are significant. This is true for both quartile portfolios, as well as the equal-
weighted decile portfolio. The estimates are consistent with the five-factor model without 
momentum. Once again, Bloomberg is statistically significant at the 5 percent level for the 
equal-weighted decile portfolio.  
Regarding systematic risk, Bloomberg and Sustainalytics show significant coefficients of their 
quartile portfolios. However, the results are contradicting; while the coefficient is negative for 
the value-weighted Bloomberg portfolio, it is positive for the Sustainalytics portfolio with same 
specifications. 
The SMB and HML factors show consistent results with the previous models and therefore we 
do not comment these factors further.  
In line with the five-factor model without momentum, the RMW coefficient on Thomson 
Reuters is positive for all four portfolios. Neither the CMA factor nor the momentum factor 











6.3. F-Test Results  
In this section, we conduct an F-test to further investigate the variance between the constructed 
ESG portfolios and the benchmark. The purpose of the test is to examine whether the variance 
of the constructed portfolios is significantly lower than the STOXX 600 Europe Index, which 







Where A denotes the variance of the Thomson Reuters portfolios, and B denotes the variance 
of the benchmark. 
Note that since only the results from the Thomson Reuters portfolios consistently showed a 
negative significant return in the previous section, we only conduct the test on these portfolios. 
When comparing the Thomson Reuters value-weighted quartile and decile portfolios, the F-test 
output shows a p-value of approx. zero in both cases7. The equally weighted portfolios show 
similar results with low p-values for both the quartile and decile portfolio8. 
The test output indicates that the variance of the constructed Thomson Reuters ESG portfolios 
are lower for all cases on a 5% significance level. Hence, we reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that the variance of the Thomson Reuters portfolios is lower than the benchmark. This 
is coherent with the risk-return trade-off theory and the findings suggests that since the 
portfolios have significantly lower return, they have significantly lower risk (Sharpe, 1964; 






7 P-values of Thom. Reuters value-weighted quartile and decile portfolios: 1.32×10-6 and 2.51×10-3, respectively. 
8 P-values of Thom. Reuters equal-weighted quartile and decile portfolios: 2.75×10-7 and 3.55×10-4, respectively.   
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6.4. Further Discussion  
In this section, we will discuss the implications of our findings.  
6.4.1.  Excess Returns  
Existing literature have established that firms with higher ESG ratings yield higher return 
(Kempf and Osthoff, 2007). However, our findings suggest the opposite, in particular portfolios 
based on ratings from Thomson Reuters. Most Thomson Reuters portfolios provide similar 
evidence that a portfolio comprising of bottom ESG performers outperform a portfolio 
comprising of top ESG performers. For the decile portfolios, the monthly difference is around 
0.6% to 0.7% basis points and for the quartile portfolios the difference is around 0.5% to 0.6% 
basis points. Our findings from the Bloomberg portfolios are only significant for decile 
portfolios, both equal- and value-weighted. Sustainalytics is the only provider that does not 
show a significant negative outperformance. This is consistent with the results from our initial 
analysis; the flat cumulative trend of the long-short portfolio from our descriptive analysis 
substantiates this observation. We would expect Bloomberg to be more coherent with Thomson 
Reuters, however, with limited insight into how the methodologies differ we do not know 
exactly why this is the case.  
As stated in our hypothesis, if we consider ESG as a risk factor, firms with low ESG scores 
should compensate their owners with a higher return. Thomson Reuters is the only provider that 
has yielded evidence consistent with this hypothesis. The Thomson Reuters portfolios generate 
a slightly negative abnormal return, which suggest that investors pay a premium in the stock 
market for firms with higher ESG ratings. However, this may change in the future, as 
government intervention may lead to changes in regulations or the providers’ approach. 
6.4.2. Exposure to Size  
The long-short portfolios have a consistent negative exposure to the SMB factor, indicating that 
large firms have better ESG ratings. A possible explanation for this result is that larger 
companies may have more resources available than smaller firms, which enables them to invest 
more time and capital into better ESG practices and certification. The findings are somewhat 
intuitive as ESG often is non-quantitative data and can be difficult to measure properly. 
Furthermore, according to Vermeir et al. (2005) larger companies often have greater social and 
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corporate responsibilities and therefore experience higher demands from the media, 
governments, and society in general to adapt more sustainable practices.  
However, from another point of view, in terms of an investor seeking to invest in the best ESG 
companies, this implies that the portfolio will be skewed towards companies with larger market 
capitalization and not necessarily the companies with the best ESG practices. A concern that 
arises from these findings is that socially responsible investors do not receive the correct 
information, as ESG ratings are potentially biased towards large capitalization companies. 
Drempetic et al. (2020) document a significant positive relationship between firm size and 
available resources for providing ESG data with the ESG score. These findings once again 
sheds light on the important discussion on what a ESG rating measures, the current 
methodologies and whether the goal of sustainable finance is improved by these measures.  
6.4.3.  Differences Among ESG Rating Providers 
Our results show differences in abnormal returns associated with the different providers’ 
portfolios. We further explore and discuss these differences by examining the composition of 
the portfolios. This includes the overlap between the portfolios, the portfolios’ sector 
breakdown, and the portfolios’ ESG attributes. We seek to provide insights as to why Thompson 
Reuters is the only provider who manages to capture the ESG risk premium and is consistent 
with our hypothesis.  
6.4.3.1. Portfolio Overlap 
First, we examine portfolio overlap with results shown in Table 8. The first part shows the large 
portfolios, while the second part covers the small portfolios. Overlap percentages are calculated 







Table 8: Portfolio Overlap 
This table shows the average overlap percentages between the constructed portfolios for the total sample period. The left 
side of the table shows the top quartile consisting of top ESG-rated firms, while the right side shows the bottom quartile 
consisting of low ESG-rated firms.  
Large Portfolios – Overlap 
Top Quartile (Long) Bottom Quartile (Short) 
 Bloomberg Sustainaly.  Bloomberg Sustainaly. 
Thom. Reut.  42% 43% Thom. Reut.  59% 35% 
Sustainaly. 29%  Sustainaly. 31%  
 
 
Small Portfolios – Overlap 
Top Decile (Long) Bottom Decile (Short) 
 Bloomberg Sustainaly.  Bloomberg Sustainaly. 
Thom. Reut.  23% 18% Thom. Reut.  54% 26% 
Sustainaly. 14%  Sustainaly. 24%  
 
We observe greater overlap for the quartile portfolios than for the decile portfolios, which 
suggests there is a certain rating consensus among the rating providers. The overlap percentages 
decrease as we sort for the decile portfolios. This indicates that the agreement among ESG 
ratings diverges as we examine the extreme observations of our sample.  
Furthermore, the overlap percentages are greater for the long portfolios with top-rated firms 
than for the short portfolios consisting of low-rated firms, with the exemption of the quartile 
portfolios of Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg. These two providers have a slightly greater 
overlap for the long portfolios than for the short portfolios. Interestingly, the overlap is greatest 
between Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg. This is consistent with the cumulative return figures 
presented in section 6.1.2. where the two providers follow similar return patterns, particularly 
for the decile portfolios.  
Moreover, the overlap between Sustainalytics and the other providers is generally low. This 
might be explained by a significant difference in methodology. While Sustainalytics rewards 
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firms for their sustainability efforts, Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg are constrained by a 
stricter rating methodology. We discuss this further in section 6.4.3.4.  
6.4.3.2. Portfolio Sector Breakdown 
Secondly, we examine the portfolio’s sector composition, which is presented in Table 9 and 
Table 10.  
Table 9: Portfolio Sector Breakdown 
This table presents the sectors represented in the quartile portfolios (in percentage). The sector composition is calculated as an 
average over the sample period, based on the composition after the annual rebalance of portfolios. The table includes the long, the 
short, and the long-short equal-weighted portfolios. The shaded areas indicate the three sectors with the largest weights in the 
portfolios.  
 
Sector Breakdown – Quartile Portfolios 
 Long-Short  Long  Short 
Sector TR BB SU  TR BB SU  TR BB SU 
Communications 7% 6% 8%  5% 5% 6%  10% 6% 10% 
Consumer Discretionary 12% 8% 12%  13% 2% 16%  12% 14% 9% 
Consumer Staples 9% 10% 9%  10% 10% 7%  9% 9% 12% 
Energy 3% 3% 4%  5% 4% 7%  2% 2% 1% 
Financials 21% 30% 18%  17% 42% 14%  25% 18% 22% 
Health Care 8% 15% 8%  8% 19% 9%  8% 12% 7% 
Industrials 18% 18% 19%  13% 8% 17%  23% 29% 21% 
Materials 11% 10% 9%  16% 10% 10%  7% 9% 9% 
Real Estate 2% 0% 3%  2% 0% 3%  2% 0% 3% 
Technology 3% 0% 5%  5% 0% 6%  2% 0% 3% 
Utilities 3% 0% 5%  6% 0% 7%  0% 0% 4% 
 
For the quartile portfolios we observe several patterns. First, the portfolios consisting of low-
rated firms have the greatest exposure towards industrials. These firms are generally given a 
low environmental score, as evidenced by a low average environmental pillar score (see Table 
11). This is intuitive, as these firms have difficulties of fulfilling certain environmental 
requirements and are consequently penalized by Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg. On the other 
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hand, Sustainalytics reward companies for their corporate sustainability efforts, evidenced by a 
greater average score of the industrial sector (see Table 11).  
All portfolios have a significant exposure to financial firms, both the for the long position and 
the short position. Interestingly, financial firms with similar business models are rated 
differently based on their ESG efforts. This indicates that the rating providers pick up a 
difference among the firms, and reward firms with good ESG practices while punishing firms 
with poor ESG practices. Similar evidence is shown for industrial firms, which are also 
represented in the long portfolios of Thomson Reuters and Sustainalytics. This demonstrates 
that firms which typically have a low environmental rating may obtain a high overall ESG 
rating. As expected, the percentage of industrial firms included in the top-rated portfolios 
decreases reduced when we sort into decile portfolios.  
Table 10: Portfolio Sector Breakdown 
This table presents the sectors represented in the decile portfolios (in percentage). The sector composition is calculated as an 
average over the sample period, based on the composition after the annual rebalance of portfolios. The table includes the long, the 
short, and the long-short equal-weighted portfolios. The shaded areas indicate the three sectors with the largest weights in the 
portfolios.  
Sector Breakdown – Small Portfolios 
 Long-Short  Long  Short 
Sector TR BB SU  TR BB SU  TR BB SU 
Communications 6% 4% 7%  1% 0% 4%  12% 8% 9% 
Consumer Discretionary 15% 7% 13%  16% 0% 18%  14% 13% 9% 
Consumer Staples 10% 6% 8%  11% 6% 8%  8% 6% 8% 
Energy 3% 1% 3%  5% 1% 6%  1% 1% 1% 
Financials 19% 40% 18%  16% 57% 10%  22% 23% 27% 
Health Care 9% 23% 10%  12% 30% 10%  7% 15% 10% 
Industrials 18% 16% 18%  8% 4% 12%  27% 27% 18% 
Materials 11% 4% 11%  16% 3% 11%  6% 6% 10% 
Real Estate 2% 0% 4%  2% 0% 2%  1% 0% 5% 
Technology 5% 0% 5%  8% 0% 7%  2% 0% 2% 




In summary, we observe similar patterns in the sectors represented in the portfolios. This reveals 
a certain consensus among the rating providers. In the next subsection we further examine the 
ESG attributes of firms included in the sample.  
In addition to the possible rating limitations described in section 4.3., a drawback of our analysis 
is that Bloomberg do not rate firms in the following sectors: Real Estate, Technology and 
Utilities. However, these three sectors are the least represented sectors in the overall data sample 
and the other providers’ exposure to these sectors is also low. This makes the overall 
implications less significant. 
6.4.3.3. ESG Attributes  
Table 11 presents the average ESG ratings of firms within the same sector included in the 
dataset.  
Table 11: Average ESG Ratings of Sectors 
This table shows the average ESG ratings of firms within the same sector included in the dataset. The shaded areas represent the 
three sectors with the best ratings within each ESG pillar for each rating provider.  
 ESG  ENVIROMENTAL  SOCIAL 
 
GOVERNANCE 
Sector TR BB SU  TR BB SU  TR BB SU 
 
TR BB SU 
Communications 58.1 59.7 70.6  52.5 42.5 68.8  61.2 66.0 70.8  54.6 70.5 65.4 
Consumer Discretionary 63.3 55.9 78.2  65.0 42.5 75.7  66.7 54.8 77.3  56.4 70.3 72.9 
Consumer Staples 64.9 61.2 72.7  65.1 50.7 71.2  69.1 61.4 71.5  57.4 71.3 62.3 
Energy 69.2 62.5 87.1  67.9 55.7 82.6  72.2 66.4 84.3  67.0 65.5 84.0 
Financials 61.0 64.6 72.2  56.5 58.0 71.0  61.9 63.4 69.0  62.4 72.2 70.6 
Health Care 63.6 63.4 75.8  55.0 54.3 73.8  71.0 67.1 75.3  58.7 68.9 69.1 
Industrials 60.2 55.3 73.9  58.0 35.0 71.8  65.4 60.5 71.7  55.0 70.4 67.3 
Materials 68.5 61.8 76.3  69.5 48.1 69.4  70.4 65.4 73.7  64.8 71.8 71.9 
Real Estate 66.3 - 73.4  74.3  -    71.4  69.6  -    75.3  53.1  -    69.1 
Technology 68.6 - 82.0  63.3  -    81.5  77.6  -    77.5  62.7  -    80.7 
Utilities 73.5 - 82.3  78.6  -    80.2  77.6  -    80.6  60.3  -    73.7 
 
The average total ESG rating of the firms rated by Sustainalytics is 76.8, which is higher than 
the average rating for Thomson Reuters (65.2) and Bloomberg (60.5). Sustainalytics is also the 
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provider that rates the fewest firms included on the STOXX Europe 600 index. The high ratings 
combined with the fewest rated firms may indicate that they exclude firms that do not meet 
certain ESG standards or firms that do not disclose certain information. Hence, it may appear 
that they exclude firms that would receive low ratings.  
Sustainalytics also differ from the other providers in its rating methodology. While Thomson 
Reuters and Bloomberg weight the three pillars equally, Sustainalytics performs an overall 
assessment of firms’ ESG risks and how the firms manage these risks. We discuss this in detail 
in the next subsection.   
6.4.3.4. Discussion on Rating Methodlogies  
Given the differences in ratings shown in our analysis, we will briefly discuss why this is the 
case by examining the different methodologies implemented by the rating providers. As 
previously mentioned, limitations of this thesis include lack of detailed data on each rating 
provider’s methodology. Nevertheless, Thomson Reuters, Bloomberg, and Sustainalytics 
provides insight on calculation of the ratings.  
According to Thomson Reuters (Refinitiv, 2020), the rating is derived from three equally 
weighted pillars, which all have different sub-criteria. Further, all scores are normalized by z-
scoring and benchmarking the rating to all companies in the database. Similarly, the ratings 
composed by Bloomberg is computed through the same equally weighted pillars, and similar 
sub-criteria as Thomson Reuters. In summary, Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg define 
corporate sustainability using comparable rating methodologies. This confirms the descriptive 
statistics and analysis, which indicate that the ratings by Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg are 
more correlated.  
In contrast with Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg, Sustainalytics’ rating is based on firms’ 
exposure or vulnerability to the risks associated with a particular ESG issue (Sustainalytics, 
2020). These risks are further divided into risks that are manageable and those that are not. For 
instance, an airline company cannot fully manage their emissions through their daily business 
operations. An admittedly extreme and concrete example from our analysis is the car 
manufacturer Porsche which is subject to the largest rating dispersion among the providers. 




Table 12: Ratings of Porsche   
This table shows the rating providers’ ratings of Porsche. It includes overall ESG ratings, environmental ratings, social ratings, and 
governance ratings from the respective providers, Thomson Reuters (TR), Bloomberg (BB) and Sustainalytics (SU).  
 ESG  ENVIROMENTAL  SOCIAL  GOVERNANCE 
Company TR BB SU  TR BB SU  TR BB SU 
 
TR BB SU 
Porsche 8.5 27.6 88.1  0.8 0 88.1  5.2 18.5 94.9  24.4 64.5 8.5 
 
The overall ESG rating of Porsche ranges from 88.1 (Sustainalytics) to 8.5 (Thomson Reuters). 
Porsche is included in Thomson Reuters’ and Bloomberg’s bottom quartile and decile 
portfolios. Sustainalytics has a substantially higher rating of 88.1, close to being included in the 
top decile and quartile. The large difference between the ratings of Porsche is difficult to explain 
but based on available information one reason is the rating approach, previously described. 
Sustainalytics identifies the management gap, which is the amount of manageable ESG risks 
that is not being managed. Sustainalytics argues that this creates a more realistic picture of how 
a company is exposed to ESG risks and how they are managed (Sustainalytics, 2020). This 
provides insight and may explain why Sustainalytics’ ratings are less correlated than the other 
providers. Furthermore, we argue that the approach where they distinguish between manageable 
and unmanageable risks generates relatively higher scores. While we do not deem such 
approach to be wrong, it is important for investors to be aware of this, because it can potentially 
have a large impact when investing based on ESG criteria. If an investor seeks to invest in low 
emission companies and uses Sustainalytics’ environmental ratings, this may produce 
conflicting information, as oil and transportation firms will not be penalized by Sustainalytics. 
Nevertheless, we argue that the increased focus on sustainability, there is doubt that 
Sustainalytics can continue to issue relatively high ratings to firms that harm the environment 
through their operations. 
Thus, we emphasize the importance for investors to understand how the different ESG ratings 
are calculated and which metrics they are based, as this is crucial to fully understand which 
provider that matches their own assessments of ESG risks.   
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7. Conclusion  
In this thesis, we investigate whether there is a premium on firms with good ESG performance 
by examining historical stock returns. We find that a long-short ESG investment strategy 
achieves a negative monthly abnormal return in the case of ratings provided by Thomson 
Reuters. The returns range from 0.50% to 0.60%. Our findings point out that there may exist a 
negative relationship between responsible firms and returns. Further, we find significant 
negative abnormal returns using ratings from Bloomberg and Sustainalytics in some cases. 
However, these are only significant for the decile portfolios. Hence, Thomson Reuters is the 
only provider that is consistent with the hypothesis that ESG may be a risk factor that captures 
the negative abnormal return of the ESG portfolio. We argue that this is a result of the current 
discrepancies in rating methodologies. Ratings are clearly subjective, illustrated by low rating 
correlation, and the choice of rating provider impacts ESG investment decisions and portfolio 
performance. This issue is amplified as providers quantify qualitative information. Considering 
our findings, we therefore recognize the necessity of implementing a common framework for 
rating corporate sustainability.  
The results of our F-tests showed clear evidence that the constructed Thomson Reuters 
portfolios are significantly less risky compared to the STOXX Europe 600. These results imply 
that ESG is priced into the market, as good ESG performers yield lower returns because they 
are less volatile. In other words, there exists a premium in return, urging investors to hold poor 
ESG-rated firms. This premium compensates investors for moral condemnation and various 
ESG related risks, such as environmental disasters, corporate scandals due to governance 
failures or government regulations.  
In summary, we find that there is an ESG premium when we use data from the European stock 
market when implementing a long-short strategy using Thomson Reuters ESG ratings. 
Regarding the vast differences in ratings and results when comparing the different providers, 
we do not have any clear evidence on why this is the case. This remains a question for future 
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A1 Model Testing 
Table 8: Model Testing: Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroscedasticity 
This table shows the results of the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity. The first section shows F-statistics and 
associated P-values of the quartile portfolios, while the second table covers the decile portfolios. The null hypothesis of this 
test is homoscedasticity, i.e., the variance of the error term is constant. In the case of a high P-value we do not reject the H0, 
and we do not have an issue. In the case of a low P-value, we account for the issue by running regressions with robust 
standard errors.  
 
Breusch-Pagan Test: Quartile Portfolios 
 Thomson Reuters ESG  Bloomberg ESG  Sustainalytics ESG 
 EW VW  EW VW  EW VW 





 (0.032) (0.117) (0.072) (0.121) (0.703) (0.554) 
FF4F 9.101 5.578 5.968 3.818 2.330 2.241 
 (0.058) (0.218) (0.202) (0.431) (0.675) (0.692) 
FF5F 10.862 7.157 6.803 12.807 1.847 2.815 
 (0.054) (0.209) (0.236) (0.025) (0.870) (0.729) 
FF5FM 10.591 8.312 5.913 8.068 2.643 3.127 
 (0.102) (0.216) (0.433) (0.233) (0.852) (0.793) 
F-statistics. P-value in parentheses. 
 
 
Breusch-Pagan Test: Decile Portfolios 
 Thomson Reuters ESG  Bloomberg ESG  Sustainalytics ESG 
 EW VW  EW VW  EW VW 





 (0.125) (0.961) (0.551) (0.688) (0.956) (0.181) 
FF4F 10.468 1.290 3.170 1.968 2.879 7.150 
 (0.033) (0.863) (0.530) (0.742) (0.578) (0.128) 
FF5F 5.918 3.103 14.353 8.143 3.705 8.671 
 (0.314) (0.684) (0.013) (0.149) (0.593) (0.123) 
FF5FM 11.707 5.124 15.473 10.165 3.760 7.721 
 (0.069) (0.528) (0.017) (0.118) (0.710) (0.259) 











Table 9: Model testing: Breusch-Godfrey Test for Autocorrelation 
This table shows the results of the Breusch-Godfrey test for autocorrelation. The first section shows Chi squared-values 
and associated P-values of the quartile portfolios, while the second table covers the decile portfolios. The null hypothesis 
of the test is no autocorrelation. Hence, we do have an issue if we observe a large Chi-value and a corresponding low P-
value. The test results only show an issue for the equally weighted quartile Bloomberg portfolio. We account for this issue 
by lagging the regression of this specific portfolio.   
 
Breusch-Godfrey Test: Quartile Portfolios  
 Thomson Reuters ESG  Bloomberg ESG  Sustainalytics ESG 
 EW VW  EW VW  EW VW 





 (0.343) (0.228) (0.033) (0.780) (0.082) (0.259) 
FF4F 1.035 1.785 4.870 0.087 2.943 1.415 
 (0.309) (0.182) (0.027) (0.768) (0.086) (0.234) 
FF5F 0.031 0.314 4.574 0.160 2.891 2.268 
 (0.860) (0.576) (0.032) (0.690) (0.089) (0.132) 
FF5FM 0.010 0.511 4.568 0.170 2.898 2.427 
 (0.918) (0.475) (0.032) (0.680) (0.089) (0.120) 
Chi squared value. P-value in parentheses. 
 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Test: Decile Portfolios 
 Thomson Reuters ESG  Bloomberg ESG  Sustainalytics ESG 
 EW VW  EW VW  EW VW 





 (0.211) (0.399) (0.127) (0.644) (0.278) (0.615) 
FF4F 2.333 0.953 2.318 0.193 1.290 0.334 
 (0.127) (0.329) (0.128) (0.660) (0.256) (0.563) 
FF5F 0.014 0.078 3.150 0.076 1.848 1.274 
 (0.905) (0.780) (0.076) (0.782) (0.174) (0.259) 
FF5FM 0.176 0.202 3.084 0.088 1.842 1.305 
 (0.675) (0.653) (0.079) (0.767) (0.175) (0.253) 













Table 10: Model testing: Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test 
This table shows the results of the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality. The null hypothesis is 
that the sample comes from a normally distributed population. The normality test is only 
performed for Thomson Reuters portfolios in relation to the F-tests.  
 
Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test: Quartile and Decile Portfolios 
  
Thomson Reuters ESG 
 EW VW 
 W-Stat P-Value W-Stat P-Value 
Quartile 0.991 0.902 0.977 0.207 
 






A2 Cumulative Returns of the Value-Weighted Portfolios  
Figure 3: Monthly Cumulative Returns of the Decile Long-Short ESG Portfolio 
This figure presents the cumulative performance (in EUR) of a EUR 1 investment in the decile long-short portfolios from 

















Thomson Reuters Bloomberg Sustainalytics
52 
 
Figure 4: Monthly Cumulative Returns of the Quartile Long-Short ESG Portfolio 
This figure presents the cumulative performance (in EUR) of a EUR 1 investment in the quartile long-short portfolios from Jan. 
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